Decision-based adversarial attack studies the generation of adversarial examples that solely rely on output labels of a target model. In this paper, decision-based adversarial attack was formulated as an optimization problem. Motivated by zeroth-order optimization, we develop Boundary Attack++, a family of algorithms based on a novel estimate of gradient direction using binary information at the decision boundary. By switching between two types of projection operators, our algorithms are capable of optimizing L2 and L∞ distances respectively. Experiments show Boundary Attack++ requires significantly fewer model queries than Boundary Attack. We also show our algorithm achieves superior performance compared to state-of-the-art white-box algorithms in attacking adversarially trained models on MNIST.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance on a variety of tasks. But they have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are maliciously perturbed examples almost identical to original samples in human perception, but cause models to make incorrect decisions [31] . The vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial examples implies a security risk in applications with real-world consequences, such as self-driving cars, robotics, financial services, and criminal justice, and also suggests a difference between humans and existing machine learning systems. The study of adversarial examples is thus necessary to identify the limitation of current machine learning algorithms, provide a metric for robustness, investigate the potential risk, and suggest ways to improve the robustness of models.
Considerable effort has gone into the design of new algorithms for the generation of adversarial examples. Adversarial examples can be categorized according to several criteria: the similarity metric, the attack goal, and the threat model. There are three widely-used similarity metrics to quantify similarity between perturbed and original images, all of which are L p distances, with p = ∞, 2, 0. They have been proposed as an approximation of human perceptual distance. Goodfellow et al. [10] proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which is optimized for L ∞ distance, and which perturbs the original example with the sign of the gradient. Kurakin et al. [15] generalize FGSM to a multi-step version, referred to as the Basic Iterative Method (BIM). Madry et al. [20] interpreted BIM as projected gradient descent in L ∞ norm, where the clip operator performs the projection. To optimize L 2 distance, Szegedy et al. [31] proposed to use box-constrained L-BFGS; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [22] presented DeepFool based on an iterative linearization of the classifier; Carlini and Wagner [6] proposed a penalty function formulation of the original constrained optimization problem, together with a new loss and change of variables, which achieved state-of-the-art performance in terms of minimizing L 2 distance. Papernot et al. [25] proposed to generate adversarial examples optimized for L 0 -distance via a greedy approach based on the Jacobian map.
The goal of attack is either untargeted or targeted. While untargeted attack is satisfied with misclassification of the model after perturbation on a given input, targeted attack aims at altering the decision of the model to a specified target class. Most of the attacks mentioned above can switch between two types of attacks via a change of loss function [15, 6, 25] .
Threat models fall into two categories: white-box and black-box. In the white-box setting, an attacker has complete access to the model, including its structure and weights. In the black-box setting, an attacker can only access outputs of the target model. Based on whether one has access to the full probability or the label of a given input, black-box attacks are further divided into score-based and decision-based. All of the methods described above [31, 10, 16, 22, 25, 6] fall into the category of the white-box attack. A widely studied type of the black-box attack is transfer-based attack. Liu et al. [19] showed that adversarial examples generated on an ensemble of deep neural networks from a white-box attack can be transferred to an unseen neural network. Papernot et al. [24, 27] proposed to train a substitute model by querying the target model. However, transfer-based attack requires access to training data, and sometimes a carefully-designed substitute model. Moreover, they can be defended against via training on a data set augmented by adversarial examples from an ensemble of substitute models [33] . Recently, Brendel et al. [3] proposed Boundary Attack, which generates adversarial examples via rejective sampling. The proposed method does not rely on training data or assumption of transferability, and is shown to be comparable with state-of-the-art white-box attacks like C&W attack [6] . However, one limitation of Boundary Attack is that it requires a relatively large number of model queries, which makes it impractical in real-world applications. Also, it is optimized only for L 2 distance.
In this paper, we propose an optimization framework to study decision-based attacks, and propose an unbiased gradient direction estimate at the decision boundary. We also propose to use binary search to approach the boundary, and analyze the error of estimate when the sample does not lie exactly at the boundary. The proposed estimate and its analysis lead to a family of hyperparameter-free iterative algorithms with three components at each iteration: estimation of gradient direction, step size search via geometric progression, and Boundary search via binary search. We refer to the algorithm as Boundary Attack++. By switching between two types of projection operators, Boundary Attack++ is capable of optimizing L 2 and L ∞ distances between perturbed and original samples. By using different binary functions defined based on output labels of the target model, Boundary Attack++ can be used for both untargeted and targeted attacks. In experiments, Boundary Attack++ requires significantly fewer model queries than Boundary Attack to generate human imperceptible adversarial examples. We also show that our algorithm achieves superior performance on adversarially trained models compared to C&W attack [6] , BIM [15, 20] and several other white-box algorithms. In summary, our contributions are • We propose an unbiased estimate of gradient direction at the decison boundary with access to binary information alone.
• We analyze the error of the proposed estimate when the sample deviates from the boundary.
• We design a family of algorithms, Boundary Attack++, based on the proposed estimate and our analysis, which is hyperparameter-free, query-efficient, capable of optimizing both L 2 and L ∞ distances, and works for both untargeted and targeted attacks.
Related work
Decision-based attacks Most related to our work is the Boundary Attack method introduced by Brendel et al. [3] . Boundary Attack is an iterative algorithm based on rejective sampling, initialized at an image that lies in the target class. At each step, a perturbation is sampled from a proposal distribution, which reduces the distance of the perturbed image towards the original input. If the perturbed image still lies in the target class, the perturbation is kept. Otherwise, the perturbation is dropped. Boundary Attack achieves performance comparable to state-of-the-art white-box attacks on deep neural networks for image classification. However, it suffers from the need for a large number of model queries. Tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of model queries are needed for getting a successful adversarial example that is human indistinguishable. One source of inefficiency in Boundary Attack is the rejection of perturbations which deviate from the target class. In our algorithm, the perturbations are used for estimation of gradient direction.
Another way of improving efficiency of Boundary Attack is to combine it with transfer-based attack. In particular, Brunner et al. [4] proposed Biased Boundary Attack, which biases the sampling procedure by combining low-frequency random noise with the gradient from a substitute model. Biased Boundary Attack is able to significantly reduce the number of model queries. However, Biased Boundary Attack relies on the transferability between the substitute model and the target model, as with other transfer-based attacks. Our algorithm does not rely on the additional assumption of transferability, and is a direct algorithmic improvement over Boundary Attack through the exploitation of discarded information into the gradient direction estimation.
Zeroth-order optimization Zeroth-order optimization refers to problems with only functional information available, instead of first-order gradient information. Such problems have been extensively studied in convex optimization and bandit problems. Flaxman et al. [9] studied one-point randomized estimate of gradient for bandit convex optimization. Agarwal et al. [1] and Nesterov and Spokoiny [23] observed a faster convergence rate by using two function evaluations for estimating gradient. Duchi et al. [8] established optimal rates of convex zeroth-order optimization via mirror descent with two-point gradient estimates. Recently, Chen et al. [7] proposed ZOO by applying zeroth-order algorithms to score-based adversarial attacks, which perform as effectively as the state-of-the-art white-box attack. [18] further improved ZOO by a zeroth-order stochastic variance reduced gradient estimate.
We formulate decision-based attack as an optimization problem (Equation (3)). A core component of our algorithm is the estimation of gradient direction, the design of which originates from zeroth-order optimization. However, the problem of decision-based attack is more challenging than zeroth-order optimization, essentially because we only have binary information from output labels of the target model, rather than function values.
An optimization framework
We assume a classification model which is a smooth function F that accepts an input x ∈ [0, 1] d and produces an output y ∈ ∆ m := {y ∈ [0, 1] m : m c=1 y c = 1}, which is treated as a probability distribution on classes. The model produces a classifier C that assigns an input x with the class of maximum probability: C(x) = arg max c F (x) c . In the decision-based setting, we assume one only has access to the classifier C, but not the underlying model F .
We study both untargeted and targeted adversarial examples. Untargeted attack aims to alter the original decision of the classifier to an arbitrary class different from the original class, while targeted attack aims to alter the original decision to a specified target class. Given an input x, we define a Boolean-valued function φ x : [0, 1] n → {−1, 1} induced by the classifier C for each kind of attacks, such that φ x (x ) = 1 if and only if x is a successful perturbation.
where we omitted the dependence of S on x. For targeted attack, φ x (x ) = 1 if C(x ) = c * , and φ x (x ) = −1 otherwise, where c * is the target class such that c * = C(x). The decision boundary for φ x is
where we have omitted the dependence of S on c * . For both attacks, we have φ x (x ) = 1 if and only if S(x ) > 0.
The goal of adversarial attack is to generate a perturbed sample x such that φ x (x ) = 1, while keeping x close to the original sample x. This can be formulated as an optimization problem [6] : min
where d is a distance metric to quantify similarity. In particular, L p norms with p = 0, 2, ∞ are often used as distance metrics [25, 10, 6] . The constrained problem (3) is difficult to solve directly. Therefore, we approximate it with a penalty function formulation [29] : min
for a carefully chosen penalty parameter ρ.
Gradient update with L 2 distance Assume d is half the squared L 2 distance for now. Problem (4) can be solved by gradient-based algorithms when one has access to the gradient of S [22, 6] , or employing a coordinate-wise approximation of the gradient when one has access to S but not its gradient [7] . We initialize the algorithm with x 0 such that φ x (x 0 ) = 1.
At the tth step, denoting the gradient estimate of S at x t by ∇S(x t ), we can write the update of gradient descent as
where we have allowed the penalty parameter ρ t to vary with t, and rewrite the gradient update as a weighted average of original sample and x t perturbed along the direction of ∇S(x t ) with an appropriately chosen size ε t . Denote the projection operator in L 2 as Π 2
x,αt x := α t x + (1 − α t )x , which projects a point x onto the L 2 -sphere centered at x of radius α t . The gradient update can be written as
Gradient update with L ∞ distance To get a unified form of gradient update, we rewrite the clip operator as the L ∞ projection operator Π ∞ x,α := Clip x,α , which performs per-pixel clip within the α-neighborhood of the corresponding pixel of x, such that the ith entry of Π ∞
x,α (x ) is Π ∞ x,α (x ) i := max{min{x i , x i − α}, x i + α}. We propose to update via a step of projected gradient descent in the L ∞ norm, which can be written as
If one replaces the gradient estimate ∇S by the true gradient ∇S, the above update coincides with the update of Basic Iterative Method (BIM) proposed by Kurakin et al. [15] and further studied in Madry et al. [20] . However, the step size ε t and the radius of projection sphere α t need to be chosen carefully when ∇S is not directly available, as we will discuss in the next few paragraphs.
Gradient direction estimation using binary information
In the decision-based setting, we only have access to the Boolean-valued function φ x . In this section, we introduce a gradient estimate based on φ x . We start with the case that the sample x t lies exactly at the boundary S(x t ) = 0. Then we discuss how to approach boundary. Finally, we discuss how to control the error for estimating the gradient with a deviation from the boundary.
At the boundary Assume the sample x t at step t is at the boundary S(x t ) = 0, we propose to approximate the direction of gradient of S at x t via
where u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u B are independent and identically distributed random unit vectors in R d sampled from a uniform distribution on the sphere, and δ is some small positive constant. Such an approximation originates from the one-point estimate of the gradient proposed by Flaxman et al. [9] , who proposed d f (x+δu) δ u as a one-point estimate of ∇f (x), with u being a normal random vector. Our proposed approximation can be interpreted as replacing the target function S by the sign φ x of S, and uses a batch instead of a single function approximation. We observe that both ∇S(x t , δ) is an unbiased gradient direction estimate at the limit: Theorem 1. Assume S has a continuous second-order derivative. When x t is at the boundary S(x t ) = 0, the direction of
The structure of the proof is as follows: we divide the unit sphere into three components: the hemisphere along the direction of gradient, the hemisphere opposite to the direction of gradient, and the annulus in between. Details are available in Appendix A.1.
Approach the boundary The proposed estimate (7) is only valid at the boundary. A key component in our algorithm is thus to approach the boundary via a binary search over α t in Equation (5) and Equation (6).
Letx t denote the updated sample before the operator Π p x,αt is applied:
We hopex t is at the opposite side of the boundary to x so that the binary search can be carried out. As we will see later,
x t lies at the desired side: φ x (x t ) = 1. Therefore, we choose the step size ε t via geometric progression. Concretely, the step size is initialized as ε t := x t − x p / √ t, at step t. The initialization makes sure the update is at a comparable scale with the L p distance in the objective, and is divided by √ t for convergence. To ensure the updated samplex t a successful perturbation, we keep decreasing ε t by half until φ x (x t ) = 1. Having found an appropriatex t , we choose the projection radius α t via a binary search to approach the boundary, as described in Algorithm 1. The binary search stops at x t+1 at the side of φ x (x t+1 ) = 1, given a threshold ξ t . For both time and query efficiency, ξ t is set to be proportional to the distance betweenx t and x: ξ t = θ x t − x p , for some small constant θ.
Controlling deviations from the boundary Binary search never lands x t+1 exactly onto the boundary. We analyze the error introduced from such a deviation, and discuss two approaches for reducing the error.
First, the size of random perturbation δ t for estimating the gradient direction is chosen as a function of image size d and the binary search threshold ξ t . This is different from numerical differentiation, where the optimal choice of δ t is at the scale of round-off errors in the approximation of real numbers with floating-point numbers (e.g., [13] ).
With a Taylor approximation of the target function S, we have
. When x t is at the boundary, we have S(x t ) = 0. Therefore, the error of gradient approximation scales at O(δ 2 t ), and this error is minimized by reducing δ t to the scale of rooted round-off error. However, the outcome x t of a finite-step binary search lies close to, but not exactly on the boundary.
When δ t is small enough so that second-order terms can be omitted, the first-order Taylor approximation implies that φ
On the other hand, the probability mass of u concentrates on the equator in a high dimensional sphere [17] . In fact, a simple calculation shows the probability mass on the cap is upper bounded. More concretely, we have
Let Π 2 ∂ be the L 2 -projection of x t onto the decision boundary:
. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the definition of L 2 -projection, we have
This yields
To avoid a loss of accuracy from concentration of measure, we let
To make the approximation error independent of dimension d, we set θ at the scale of d −q , which implies that the number of model queries in binary search will have a logarithmic dependence on dimension. In practice, we set
Another source of error comes from the variance of the gradient direction estimation. When x t deviates from the boundary and δ t is not exactly zero, perturbed samples x t + δ t u b distribute unequally at the two sides of the boundary, as is characterized by Equation (10). That is,
As an attempt to control variance, we introduce a baseline φ x :
into the estimate, which yields the following estimate:
It can be easily observed that the above estimate is still unbiased at the boundary as δ → 0:
We show that the introduction of baseline reduces the variance when E[φ x (x t + δu)] deviates from 0. The variance of a random vector v ∈ R d is characterized by the trace of its covariance operator:
Var(v i ). 
Boundary Attack++
We now combine the above analysis into an iterative algorithm, Boundary Attack++. It is initialized with a sample in the target class for untargeted attack, and with a sample blended with uniform noise that is misclassified for targeted attack. Each iteration of the algorithm has three components. First, the iterate from the last iteration is pushed towards the boundary via a binary search (Algorithm 1). Second, the gradient direction is estimated via Equation (7). Third, an appropriate step size is selected via geometric progression until perturbation becomes successful. At the end, the perturbed sample is pushed back to the boundary via binary search. The complete version is summarized in Algorithm 2. Figure 1 provides an intuitive visualization of the three steps in L 2 . The only hyperparameters are batch size and the number of iterations. Our algorithm is robust to the choice of batch size. To use model queries efficiently, we increase the batch size with t by setting
We set B 0 = 100 across all experiments. The number of iterations can be chosen based on the budget of model queries.
Algorithm 1 Binary-search
Require: Upper bound x u , lower bound x l , threshold ξ. Define φ x accordingly based on the type of attack. Set θ based on Equation (11). 
Size of Perturbation δ t 
Experiments
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of our gradient direction estimate, and also compare Boundary Attack++ with Boundary Attack. We also demonstrate the performance of our algorithms on adversarially trained models. The code for Boundary Attack++ is publicly available at https://github.com/Jianbo-Lab/BAPP.
Sensitivity analysis for gradient direction estimation
We carry out experiments for validating proposed tricks for estimating gradient direction when the sample deviates from the boundary. In particular, we focus on the choice of δ t and the introduction of baseline analyzed in Section 4.
We use 20-layer ResNet [11] trained over CIFAR-10 [14] . Over a subset of randomly sampled images, we run the L 2 -version of Boundary Attack++ for 60 iterations. Perturbed images at the ith iteration are used as the base image to carry out estimation of gradient direction, for i = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60. We use the inner product between the gradient direction estimate and the truth gradient of the model as a metric. Figure 2 shows the box plots of two gradient direction estimates as δ t varies among 0.01δ * t , 0.1δ * t , δ * t , 10δ * t , 100δ * t , where δ * t = 10 √ dθ x t−1 − x 2 is our proposed choice. We observe that our proposed choice of δ t yields the highest inner product on average. Also, the baseline in ∇S further improves the performance, in particular when δ t is not chosen optimally.
Efficiency evaluation
We compare Boundary Attack++ with Boundary Attack [3] on image classification tasks. The experiments are carried out over three image data sets: MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 [14] . For MNIST, we use a simple convolutional network composed of two convolutional layers followed by a hidden dense layer with 1024 units. Two convolutional layers have 32, 64 filters respectively, each of which is followed by a max-pooling layer. For both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we train a 20-layer ResNet [11] and 121-layer DenseNet [12] respectively. We analyze results on ResNet here. The comparison between Boundary Attack++ and Boundary Attack on DenseNet trained on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 yields similar results, so we omit the analysis here. The plots can be found in Appendix B. All pixels are scaled to be in the range [0, 1]. For each data set, 1, 000 randomly drawn test images are used, which are evenly distributed across classes, and correctly classified by the respective model. random noise (i.i.d. at each pixel), and increase the weight of uniform noise gradually until it is misclassified. In Foolbox, the initialization is named as "BlendedUniformNoiseAttack," and is used as the default initialization of Boundary Attack [28] . For targeted attack, the target class is selected uniformly at random among the labels that are not correct. The same target class and a common image are used as the initialization of Boundary Attack++ and that of Boundary Attack.
For untargeted attack, we initialize both Boundary Attack++ and Boundary Attack by blending an original image with uniform
We use two metrics for evaluation. The first metric is the median L p distance between the perturbed and original samples over a subset of test images, as was used by Carlini and Wagner [6] for evaluating white-box attacks. The normalized version of the same metric by image dimension was employed by Brendel et al. [3] for evaluating Boundary Attack. The first quartile and the third quartile are used as lower and upper error bars. For each sample, the number of model evaluations and the distance are recorded every iteration for both Boundary Attack and Boundary Attack++, with linear interpolation between two recorded steps. Boundary Attack++ yields faster convergence than Boundary Attack across all data sets in terms of model queries. As an alternative metric, we also fix the number of model queries to be 1K, 2K, 5K, 10K and 20K, and report the success rate at various distance thresholds for both algorithms. A successful example is defined as a perturbed sample whose distance with the corresponding original sample does not exceed the given distance threshold. Figure 3 plots the median L 2 distance against the number of evaluations, and success rate against L 2 distance threshold over 1, 000 test images on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. The left two columns show the results for untargeted attack, and the right two columns are for targeted attack. For both targeted and untargeted attacks, Boundary Attack++ yields a significantly smaller L 2 distance than Boundary Attack with the same number of queries. Targeted attack requires more queries than untargeted attack, as the task is more challenging on average. This becomes more evident in CIFAR-100, which has more classes, resulting in a larger distance between the original sample and the decision boundary between the original class and the target class. By querying the model for 5K times, Boundary Attack++ still successfully controls the L 2 distance within 3 and 1 respectively on MNIST and CIFAR-10 for 80% of the images. CIFAR-100 requires 10K queries to achieve comparable performance. The success rate of Boundary Attack at the given thresholds is less than 10% with the same number of queries. As a comparison with the state-of-the-art white-box targeted attack, C&W Attack [6] achieves an average L 2 distance of 1.76 on MNIST and 0.33 on CIFAR-10.
Within a thousand queries, the size of perturbation from untargeted Boundary Attack++ decreases to a scale that humans can easily tell the truth label, and the perturbation becomes nearly indistinguishable in most images on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 with a few thousand queries. Visualization of untargeted adversarial examples at various scales generated by Boundary Attack++ on CIFAR10 can be found in Appendix C. Targeted attack takes relatively more queries. Visualization of targeted adversarial examples at various scales generated by Boundary Attack++ on CIFAR10 can be found in Figure 4 . Figure 5 plots the median L ∞ distance against the number of evaluations, together with the success rate against L ∞ distance threshold over 1, 000 test images on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. [20] . See Appendix D for example images on MNIST and CIFAR10 with given L ∞ thresholds.
The right two columns show the results for targeted attack. As a comparison with the state-of-the-art white-box targeted attacks, BIM [15] achieves an average L ∞ distance of 0.19 on MNIST and 0.014 on CIFAR-10, which can be achieved by running Boundary Attack++ with around 10K-20K queries. For both targeted and untargeted attacks, Boundary Attack++ yields a much faster convergence than Boundary Attack, which was designed for optimizing L 2 distance. Visualization of targeted adversarial examples at various scales generated by Boundary Attack++ on CIFAR10 can be found in Figure 4 , with untargeted examples in Appendix C.
Performance on adversarially trained models
The research community has proposed many defending mechanisms to help models correctly classify adversarial examples, including distributional smoothing [21] , defensive distillation [26] , generative models [30] , feature squeezing [34], and adversarial training [10, 15, 20, 32] . Adversarial training has been shown to be one of the most effective defense mechanisms against adversarial perturbation [5, 2] . An adversarially trained model gets close to 90% accuracy under adversarial perturbation on the commonly used toy data set MNIST, although the approach becomes less effective on other data sets.
We investigate the performance of adversarially trained models under the threat of decision-based attacks on MNIST. The models were trained through a robust optimization method proposed by Madry et al. [20] against L ∞ projected gradient descent. The perturbation is of size ε = 0.3 for MNIST. The trained model is publicly available online 1 .
We also compare with state-of-the-art algorithms that require access to the gradient of the model, including C&W Attack [6] , DeepFool [22] for minimizing L 2 distance, and FGSM [10] , and L ∞ PGD [16, 20] for minimizing L ∞ distance. These algorithms assume a stronger threat model than decision-based attacks like Boundary Attack and our algorithm. For C&W Attack, we did a 10-iteration binary search for the weight of distance penalty in loss function, so as to find a successful perturbation of minimal size. For FGSM and L ∞ PGD, we report success rates at respective constraints directly. We run Boundary Attack until convergence, which takes around 100K model queries, and run Boundary Attack++ with 25K model queries. Figure 6 shows the success rate of each algorithm at different distance thresholds. When the L ∞ distance is kepted within 0.3, the size of perturbation for adversarial training [20] , Boundary Attack++ achieves a success rate of 9.8%, which transfers to an accuracy of 88.76% on the original model, comparable to the white-box attack with best performance. The L ∞ PGD achieves a success rate of 7.4%. 
Discussion
We have proposed a novel estimate of gradient direction using binary information from the model decision. Based on the estimate, we have designed a family of query-efficient algorithms, Boundary Attack++, for decision-based generation of adversarial examples. Boundary Attack++ is capable of optimizing L 2 and L ∞ distances for both targeted and untargeted attacks. Experiments show Boundary Attack++ compares favorably to Boundary Attack in efficiency, and achieves superior performance to state-of-the-art white-box algorithms in attacking adversarially trained models on MNIST.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The idea of the proof is to divide the unit sphere into three components: the hemisphere along the direction of gradient, the hemisphere opposite to the direction of gradient, and the annulus in between.
Let u be a random vector uniformly distributed on the sphere. By Taylor's theorem, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
for some x on the line between x t and x t + δu. Let λ be the supremum of all eigenvalues of Hessians at a unit ball around
We can bound the second-order term as
For any given ε > 0, there exists w > 0 such that
where 2w will be the width of annulus in between. Let δ := max{ 2w λ , 1}. By the Taylor expansion and the bound on the second order term by eigenvalues, when ∇S(x t ) T u > w, we have
Similarly, we have S(x t + δu) < 0 when ∇S(x t ) T u < −w. Therefore, we have
We expand the vector ∇S(x t ) to an orthogonal bases in 
By taking small enough δ, we could further shrink the annulus such that
The expected value of E ∇S(x t , δ) is
Thus, we have
∇S(x t ).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For notational simplicity, we denote
We use ξ, u to denote i.i.d. copies of ξ b and u b respectively. The variance of the estimate with the baseline is
When a = b, the summand can be simplified by independence of u a , u b and independence of ξ a u a , ξ b u b . In fact,
The middle term can be expanded as
Plugging into Equation (18), we get
which implies Var( ∇S(x t , δ)) < Var ( ∇S(x t , δ) ). Figure 7 . Median L2 distance vs. number of model queries and Success rate vs. L2 distance threshold on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. The first two columns are results of untargeted attack, and the latter two columns are results of targeted attack. Figure 8 . Median L∞ distance vs. number of model queries and Success rate vs. L∞ distance threshold on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. The first two columns are results of untargeted attack, and the latter two columns are results of targeted attack.
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